We construct a cooperative sta¢ ng game to investigate how to fairly allocate the reduced number of sta¤s among multiple call centers that pool (centralize) their capacities. We show that this game is essential and submodular, and thereby, convex with a non-empty core. We also propose a neat Shapley value-characterized sta¤-allocation rule, which exists in the core of the game.
Introduction
The past decade has witnessed a number of successful practices in which multiple call centers centralize their capacities to achieve scale economy or other pooling e¤ects. Such practices are particularly common to the small spatially-separated call centers, which are more willing to be virtually or physically pooled into a large call center. For example, a U.S. bank has four call centers serving customers in di¤erent regions. An incoming call from a region is …rst assigned to the center that is located in the region. If the call's waiting time reaches 10 seconds, then the call will be sent to an interqueue and then be answered by all four call centers, depending on which center has an available agent [6] . In fact, the telecommunication technique is highly capable of realizing the above virtual pooling system. In addition to the wide existence of the pooling of separate call centers, such a strategy has also been implemented within a call center. For example, the agents in a call center are usually divided into di¤erent groups serving di¤erent types of customers. Such dedicated groups can be merged into a single group through cross-training, as discussed by Tekin, Hopp, and Oyen [23] .
The bene…t of pooling call centers can be illustrated through the following square-root safety sta¢ ng rule (see, e.g., Borst, Mandelbaum, and Reiman [3] ). Consider n 2 call centers-i.e., call center i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n), which has an arrival rate i and a service rate . Let R i = i = denote call center i's o¤ ered load. The asymptotically optimal sta¢ ng level that balances call center i's cost and its customers'waiting time can be written as N i = R i + p R i , where > 0 is a parameter dependent on the sta¢ ng cost c and the customer's waiting cost a [3] . Assume that a, c, and are the same for all call centers, which implies that is also the same across all call centers. Under the above assumption, the total sta¤ number needed before pooling is P n i=1 i = + P n i=1 p i = , and that needed after pooling is P n i=1 i = + p P n i=1 i = . Since p P n i=1 i = < P n i=1 p i = , we …nd that pooling n call centers can reduce the total sta¤ number.
Although the square-root safety sta¢ ng rule can determine the total required sta¤ number for call centers after pooling, the rule still cannot indicate how to allocate the total sta¤ number to each individual call center. One may note that each call center shall have an incentive to cooperate with other(s), if and only if the number of its sta¤ is reduced as a result of pooling. A critical question thus arises as follows: how many sta¤s shall be allocated to each call center such that all centers are willing to pool?
In this note, we construct a cooperative sta¤ allocation game for n call centers that pool their capacities. Assuming that the sta¤s at all call centers have similar working skills, we …nd that the centers have an identical service rate . In addition, the sta¢ ng cost c and the customer's waiting cost a are assumed to be identical at all call centers. We show that our sta¢ ng game is essential and submodular, and thereby, convex with a non-empty core. Using the Shapley value solution concept, we derive a unique and fair sta¤ allocation scheme, which indicates that after pooling, the number of sta¤s allocated to call center i is
g, and C(l i ; k) is the l i th coalition formed by k call centers inclusive of center i. We …nd that the Shapley value-characterized sta¢ ng rule is always in the non-empty core of our game; that is, such allocation mechanism is fair and stable, and no call center has an incentive to leave the pooling coalition.
The remainder of the note is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature.
Our main results are discussed in Section 3. Moreover, a brief description of cooperative game theory-which is a major methodology used in our analysis-is presented in online Appendix A.
All proofs are relegated to online Appendix B. We provide a numerical example to illustrate our cooperative game analysis in online Appendix C.
Literature Review
This note is related to the literature on the sta¢ ng and pooling problems for call centers. With di¤usion approximation, Borst, Mandelbaum, and Reiman [3] considered the sta¢ ng problem of a single-class, single-pool M=M=N queue subject to cost consideration and other constraints. Mandelbaum and Zeltyn [16] extended Borst, Mandelbaum, and Reiman's analysis [3] into a model with customer abandonment. More publications along this line can be found in the surveys written by Akşin, Armony, and Mehrotra [1] and Gans, Koole, and Mandelbaum [8] .
The study on call center pooling mainly focuses on workforce management. Jouini, Dallery, and Nait-Abdallah [13] examined the bene…ts of migrating from a call center with all agents pooled together towards a call center with dedicated agent groups. The authors showed that, despite the drawbacks of less pooling e¤ects, such change can bring some bene…ts due to better human resource management. Tekin, Hopp, and Oyen [23] investigated the bene…ts of pooling dedicated groups of agents into a general group after cross-training. They considered the impact of system parameters such as the number of servers, and the mean and correlation of service times, on the decision on which groups to pool. Van Dijk and van der Sluis [25] discussed the bene…ts of pooling call centers and showed that with multiple job types, the pooling e¤ect could be negative. Di¤erent from the above publications, we now focus on how to fairly allocate among multiple call centers the sta¢ ng cost saving that result from pooling their capacities.
Other relevant literature includes those publications regarding the cooperative game in queueing systems. In fact, all early publications concerning the pooling of call centers are mainly related to the cooperative game analysis of fairly allocating total waiting costs among waiting customers, as discussed by, e.g., Chun ([4] , [5] ), Haviv [11] , Haviv and Ritov [12] , Katta and Sethuraman [14] , Maniquet [17] , etc. Applying the theory of cooperative games to address the capacity pooling problem for queueing systems starts in recent years. Anily and Haviv [2] addressed the problem of how to share the cost savings among multiple one-server service systems, showing that the core of the game is non-empty. Yu, Benjaafar, and Gerchak [29] considered a similar problem and presented a cost-sharing mechanism where each call center is better o¤ when cooperating than acting individually. Di¤erent from Anily and Haviv [2] and Yu, Benjaafar, and Gerchak [29] -who focused on the capacity pooling among one-server queues, we consider the sta¤ pooling among multiple-server call centers.
Cooperative Sta¢ ng Game: Model and Analysis
In this section, as discussed in online Appendix A, we …st calculate the characteristic values of all possible coalitions to construct our n-center cooperative sta¢ ng game. Then we derive a unique, fair sta¤ allocation scheme for these call centers.
Characteristic Values of All Possible Coalitions
In our cooperative sta¢ ng game, the characteristic value of a coalition is de…ned as the number of sta¤ that are needed for all call centers belonging to the coalition. For the empty coalition ?, there is no call center and therefore, the number of sta¤ is zero. Thus, the characteristic value of the empty coalition is v(?) = 0.
Characteristic Values of One-Center Coalitions. From §1, we know that before cooperating with any other call centers, the number of the sta¤ needed by a single call center i is 
Characteristic Values of k-Center Coalitions with 2 k n. As any subset of k (2 k n) call centers may form a k-center coalition, there are
Without loss of generality, we now consider the lth k-center coalition, which we denote by C(l; k), for l = 1; 2; : : : ; n k and 2 k n. According to Borst, Mandelbaum, and Reiman [3] , the characteristic value v(l; k), which is the number of sta¤s needed for the coalition C(l; k), can be computed as
, for l = 1; 2; : : : ; n k and 2 k n. (2) where R(l; k) P i2C(l;k) ( i = ) denotes the o¤ered load of the coalition C(l; k). Note that there exists only one n-player (grand ) coalition. We simply write the grand coalition as C(n) f1; 2; : : : ; ng, and its characteristic value is
Sta¢ ng Decision: Solution of Our Cooperative Game
To solve the sta¤ allocation problem for the n pooled call centers, we need …rst examine whether there exists a sta¤ allocation approach such that some or all call centers are willing to cooperate.
More speci…cally, we need investigate which coalition is stable. The stability of a coalition means that no member (call center) in the coalition has an incentive to leave the coalition. Since each call center aims at reducing its sta¤ number and saving its operating cost, a coalition in our cooperative sta¢ ng game is stable if and only if each call center in the coalition can hire less sta¤ after joining the coalition.
A necessary condition for the stability of our n center cooperative game G is that the game is
for any two disjoint coalitions C 0 and C 00 in the game ( [22] ). For example, assume that there are two call centers, center 1 and center 2. Before call centers 1 and 2 cooperate, they need v(1) and v(2) sta¤, respectively; but, after the two centers are centralized, they jointly need v(12) sta¤. If v(12) < v(1) + v(2), then we can …nd a sta¤ allocation scheme that assures the stability of the coalition f1; 2g. Otherwise, if v(1) + v(2) v(12), then we cannot …nd a sta¤ allocation scheme to assure that both centers are willing to stay together in the coalition f1; 2g. Hence, it is important to determine whether our game is subadditive.
Submodularity
A cost (sta¢ ng) cooperative game must be convex and subadditive if its characteristic function is submodular (Driessen [7] and Topkis [24] ). We learn from Driessen [7] that our game is submodular
Theorem 1
The characteristic function of our n player cooperative game G is submodular; thus, the game G is convex and subadditive.
The above theorem implies that when more call centers form a coalition, the characteristic value of the coalition is lower owing to the economies of scope resulting from the subadditive property of the game. That is, as a result of pooling more centers, less sta¤ are needed and the centers should be more e¢ cient. It thus follows that all the n centers shall have incentives to join the grand coalition C(n).
However, for the grand coalition C(n) to be stable, we still need a su¢ cient condition; that is, the sta¤ number v(n) shall be allocated to all call centers in a fair way. More speci…cally, if the number of the sta¤ assigned to each center is no more than what this center has to hire after leaving the grand coalition, then all call centers are willing to stay in the grand coalition which makes the grand coalition stable.
Fair Sta¤ Allocation Scheme
Denote m i as the number of the sta¤ allocated to center i. Then we can characterize any proper sta¤ allocation of the characteristic value (total sta¤ number) v(n) by using an n tuple of numbers M (m 1 ; m 2 ; : : : ; m n ) with the following two properties: (i) individual rationality, i.e., m i v(i),
for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; (ii) collective rationality, i.e.,
A n tuple (m 1 ; m 2 ; : : : ; m n ) satisfying the above two properties is called an imputation for the sta¢ ng game G = (C(n); v) ( [22] ). Below, in order to …nd a fair sta¤ allocation scheme, we need …rst examine the non-emptiness of the core (Gillies [9] and Owen [19] ), which, for our game, is de…ned as the set of all undominated imputations (m 1 ; m 2 ; : : : ; m n ) such that P i2T m i v(T ) for all coalitions T C(n).
Theorem 2
The core for our n player cooperative sta¢ ng game in characteristic-function form is non-empty. That is, the grand coalition C(n) is stable if all call centers implement a sta¤ allocation scheme in the core.
Since any point in the non-empty core represents a fair imputation (allocation scheme), there could exist many sta¤ assignment schemes each assuring the stability of the grand coalition. An important question thus arises: Which sta¤ allocation scheme in the core shall be applied to allocate the total sta¤ number v(n) among n call centers? Therefore, it would be interesting to …nd a unique sta¤ allocation scheme for our cooperative game.
According to online Appendix A, Shapley value (Shapley [21] ) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler [20] ) are the two commonly-used solutions each representing a unique, fair imputation (sta¤ allocation scheme for our sta¢ ng problem). However, to obtain the nucleolus solution, one needs to solve a series of linear programming (LP) problems (Wang [27] ); for recent applications in the business area, see Guo, Leng, and Wang [10] and Leng and Parlar [15] . Due to the complexity of the nucleolus, we shall avoid this solution in this note. Instead, we adopt the Shapley value solution concept, under which the number of sta¤ allocated to call center i, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, is calculated as
where T denotes a possible call-center coalition that center i joins and jT j is the number of call centers in coalition T . It is proper to use Shapley value to characterize a unique, fair sta¤ allocation scheme for our n player cooperative game because of the following three reasons:
1. As discussed in online Appendix A, Shapley value is based on three axioms (i.e., symmetry; zero allocation to dummy player; additivity). Clearly, our sta¢ ng problem satis…es the above three axioms.
2. As discussed by Topkis [24] , Shapley value for a convex cooperative game must exist in a non-empty core. As our n player cooperative game is convex, Shapley value must be in the non-empty core of our game and the resulting sta¤ allocation scheme can assure the stability of the grand coalition.
3. Shapley value is a monotonic solution (Megiddo [18] and Young [28] ). For our cooperative sta¢ ng game, the monotonicity of a solution means that, if the sta¤ number for each possible coalition decreases, then the number of the sta¤ assigned to each center shall also decrease.
Since any acceptable sta¤ allocation scheme should be monotonic, Shapley value is a proper solution concept for our sta¢ ng problem.
Theorem 3 When we use Shapley value to allocate the total sta¤ number v(n) among n call centers, the number of the sta¤ assigned to call center i, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, is computed as
where R i = i = is call center i's o¤ered load and,
It is interesting to note from (3) that, when we use Shapley value to fairly allocate total sta¤ number v(n) among n call centers, the number of sta¤ assigned to call center i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n)
is simply equal to the center's o¤ ered load R i plus an additional term (i.e., i = p ). This resembles the square-root safety sta¢ ng rule. Recall from Section 3.1 that, when call center i does not cooperate with any other centers but instead serves customers by itself, this center's optimal sta¤ number v(i) equals the o¤ered load R i plus an addition term (i.e.,
The only di¤erence is that the term p i in the latter is replaced by i in the former. The following theorem shows the order between them.
Theorem 4
For call center i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, i < p i .
Theorem 4 implies that for our n player cooperative game, the Shapley value-characterized sta¤ number m i for center i is smaller than v(i). That is, if n call centers cooperate to jointly serve customers, then the sta¤ number for each call center must be smaller than that when these centers operate independently. In fact, this important result con…rms our Theorems 1 and 2 : If the call centers do not operate independently but decide to cooperate, then the resulting n player cooperative game must be submodular with a non-empty core. Moreover, as discussed previously, Shapley value must exist in the non-empty core. Therefore, when we use (3) to assign sta¤ among n call centers, all the centers are better o¤ by cooperating with each other than by operating independently and thus the grand coalition C(n) is stable.
Corollary 1 If n call centers cooperate to form the grand coalition C(n) instead of operating independently, call center i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) can reduce its sta¤ number by (
i is given as in (4).
Note that a cost cooperative game with n player is essential if
). We can further conclude that our cooperative sta¢ ng game is essential since
. This property demonstrates that the pooling of n call centers can essentially improve the e¢ ciency of system-wide operation.
Remark 1 When we calculate v(i) and v(l; k) in Section 3.1 and compute the Shapley valuecharacterized sta¤ number m i by using (3), the resulting number of sta¤ could be a decimal number rather than an integer. For such case, one may believe that we need to round that decimal number to an integer. This is unnecessary. In reality, a …rm may hire both full-time and part-time sta¤. A decimal sta¤ number indicates that the center hires some part-time sta¤. For example, if m i = 2:3, then the call center i can hire two full-time sta¤ and one part-time sta¤ who works at the center for only 30% of normal working time. C A numerical example is provided in online Appendix C to illustrate the above analysis. In the theory of cooperative games, the "characteristic value" of a coalition is the minimum amount that the coalition can attain using its own e¤orts only. In our note, the characteristic value of a coalition is de…ned as the minimum necessary sta¤ number that is needed by all call centers in the coalition. Since any one or more call centers may form a coalition, in our n player cooperative game, all possible coalition include the empty coalition (that does not involve any call center), n one-player coalitions and
Note that, when k = n, all call centers form an n player coalition which is also known as grand coalition. We have to compute the characteristic values for all the above possible coalitions; in §3.1, we provide more discussions on coalition structures and corresponding characteristic values.
After building a cooperative game, we need examine whether or not all call centers are willing to form the grand coalition; that is, we will investigate the stability of the grand coalition. This is one of the most important questions in the theory of cooperative games. In order to assure the stability of the grand coalition for our sta¢ ng game, we need …nd a fair allocation scheme that determines the sta¤ number for each call center. For our problem, the "fairness"of an allocation scheme means that the number of sta¤ assigned to each call center should be no more than that when the call center leaves the grand coalition. That is, under a fair allocation scheme, none of the call centers should have any incentives to deviate from the grand coalition, which implies that the fair allocation scheme is undominated by any other possible scheme. To …nd a fair allocation scheme, we apply some appropriate solution concepts from the theory of cooperative games. Leng and Parlar [15] discuss two categories of commonly-used concepts: Set-valued solution concepts and unique-valued solution concepts; and they conclude that the core (Gillies [9] ), Shapley value (Shapley [21] ), and the nucleolus (Schmeidler [20] ) are most common solution concepts that have been widely used in the management science/operations management …eld. Next, we brie ‡y describe these three important concepts.
The core was …rst introduced by Gillies [9] . The core of an n-person cost cooperative game in characteristic form is de…ned as the set of all undominated imputations (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n ) such that for all coalitions T N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, we have P i2T x i v(T ); see Owen [19] for the description of the core. Although the allocation schemes suggested by the core assure stability of the grand coalition, the core could be empty for some games. Even if the core is non-empty for our game, we have to address the question of which allocation (sta¤ assignment) scheme should be used for allocating the sta¤ among n call centers. Therefore, after examining whether the core is empty, we also need to …nd a unique fair sta¤ allocation scheme for our n player sta¢ ng game.
For a n-player game (n 2), there are two commonly-used solution concepts-Shapley value and the nucleolus solution. The solution concept of Shapley value represents a unique imputation (allocation scheme) x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n ) where the payo¤s x i ,i = 1; 2; : : : ; ; n are distributed fairly by an outside "arbitrator". Shapley [22] derives the unique Shapley values (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) as Even though the Shapley value can be computed easily by using a formula, the Shapley value may not be in the non-empty core, thus making the grand coalition unstable. An alternative solution concept is the " nucleolus" (Schmeidler [20] ), which de…nes an allocation scheme that minimizes the "unhappiness" of the most unhappy coalition. More speci…cally, for a cost cooperative game, denote e T (x) = P i2T x i v(T ) as the excess (unhappiness) of a coalition T with an imputation x. Then the nucleolus can be found as follows: (i) First consider those coalitions T whose excess e T (x) is the largest for a given imputation x, (ii) If possible, vary x to make this largest excess smaller, (iii) When the largest excess is made as small as possible, consider the next largest excess and vary x to make it as small as possible, etc. Normally, the nucleolus solution can be found by solving a sequence of linear programming problems (Wang [27] ), and in general, it may be di¢ cult to compute this solution analytically. This restricts the applications of the nucleolus.
Appendix B Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. For our cooperative sta¢ ng game, we examine the submodularity of our game by Driessen's approach [7] . That is, we investigate if the following conditions are satis…ed for
Assume that S and T are k 1 and k 2 centers coalitions with k 2 k 1 , respectively; that is, S = C(k 1 ) and T = C(k 2 ) = S [ C 0 where C 0 6 = ?. Thus, the number of sta¤s for coalition S and that for coalition T are computed as,
and v(T ) =
Using the above, we have,
When call center j 2 C(n) T joins coalition S, the number of sta¤ needed for the resulting
Similarly, when call center j joins coalition T , the number of sta¤ for the resulting (k 2 + 1) player coalition T [ fjg is calculated as,
It thus follows that
Comparing
Letting A P i2T i and B P i2S i , we re-write the above to
Noting that p j + A p j + B and p A p B, we …nd that the sign of the term [(
] is the same as the sign of the following expression:
which is non-positive because 2 p AB A + B and so j + p AB p ( j + A)( j + B). So Z 0 and v(T [ fjg) v(S [ fjg) v(T ) v(S). Thus, our cooperative game must be submodular.
Proof of Theorem 2. This theorem follows from the submodularity of our n player cooperative game, because, as indicated by Driessen [7] and Topkis [24] , any convex game must have a nonempty core.
Proof of Theorem 3. A unique Shapley value (Shapley [21] ) for center i can be computed by using m i = P i2T (jT j 1)!(n jT j)![v(T ) v(T i)]=n!, where T is a possible coalition that center i may join. To obtain m i , we …rst identify all possible coalitions that involve center i. 
